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3d. Perspectives*

DCI/IC 74-0614

22 March 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR:



AD/DCI/IC


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SUBJECT:

Perspectives for Intelligence Planning

1. The Director has asked that this document be updated to project-as we see it now-the environment in which the US Intelligence Community can be expected to operate during the remainder of this decade. The attached draft attempts to respond to his directive that it be future oriented and track with NIE judgments. He does not want a long and discursive paper, and has indicated that the length and outline of this draft are about right.

2. For your information, this will be Part I of Colby's "Perspectives" paper. He wants this part to point as specifically as possible to the developments during the next several years that are going to require new or improved intelligence capabilities. In Part II he can then identify in a broad sense the activities which he expects the Intelligence Community to take.


3. The DCI has asked that the NIOs critique this draft with the hope that he can turn to it again shortly after his return. We are prepared to proceed in whichever manner is more convenient for each NIO. While your written changes would be most helpful, if you prefer to discuss your suggestions orally with us, we will then endeavor to incorporate them in a redraft.  is prepared to undertake this task.

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4. Either way, we hope we can hear from you before COB 27 March.



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Director  PRG/IC

Attachment

cc: D/DCI/NIO

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I. TRENDS IN THE WORLD SITUATION

A. The Great Power Adversaries

1. Relations among the world's major powers are shifting into new and sometimes novel configurations. Tensions between the US and each of its two principal adversaries, the USSR and China, are easing, and the character of the relationship between East and West in Europe is changing in a perhaps fundamental way. At the same time, the cold war between China and the Soviet Union shows little or no promise of imminent thaw, and partly because of the improving climate of relations between the two superpowers, ties between the US and Western Europe have begun to fray.

2. Few matters of importance in world affairs will arise in the 1970s which will not be affected by the state of relations between the US, the USSR, and China. Two basic circumstances will shape the course of these relations: the USSR's progress in achieving strategic parity with the US, and the course of the military confrontation between China and the Soviet Union in Asia. Recently these factors have combined in various ways to reinforce the trend in both Moscow and Peking toward policies of detente vis-a-vis the West. Specifically, for example, the desire of each Communist power to prevent the other from gaining relatively greater favor with Washington has encouraged

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both to proceed with some restraint vis-a-vis the US, even in the face of strong US initiatives. This competition is expected to continue.

3. Moscow's intentions and motivations in the areas of strategic arms limitation and mutual and balanced force reduction will continue to defy easy assessment. On the one hand the Soviets apparently will adhere to an overall foreign policy aimed at far-reaching detente with the US and its allies. On the other hand Moscow can be expected to pursue vigorously weapons development programs that portend substantial improvements in Soviet military capabilities. Indeed the qualitative advances in prospect for Soviet strategic offensive forces, coupled with improvements in Soviet strategic defenses, could enable the USSR to gain a decisive advantage over the US.

4. Acute Sino-Soviet hostility and the degree of restraint vis-a-vis the West which is encouraged by that hostility are not necessarily fixed elements in the three-power relationship. The Chinese are obviously devoting much energy to increasing their military defenses vis-a-vis the Soviet Union; and Chinese nuclear power is reaching a level precluding any rational Soviet decision to resort to military action against Peking. It is possible that, independently of developments in the military sphere, the post-Mao (and perhaps post-Chou) regime in Peking will seek a lessening of Sino-Soviet tension. Chances of a fundamental reconciliation between

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China and the USSR seem remote as long as the Soviets show no inclination to reduce their military forces along the Chinese border. A limited improvement in relations is unlikely in and of itself to significantly affect either power's attitude toward detente.

B. The US and Other Major Power Centers

5. The evolving pattern of relations among the three great powers, the climate of detente in East-West relations, and the growth of a general sense of West European self-assertiveness will continue to thrust another major power center, Western Europe, into the area of prime intelligence interest. The Europeans are likely to be increasingly preoccupied with their own Community concerns, less agitated about the Soviet military threat (at least in the near and mid-term), and will pursue their own national interests (both economic and political) with less regard for those of the US and sometimes for those of the Atlantic Community as a whole. Events which exacerbate their apprehension about the durability of the US commitment to Europe and increase their suspicions of US motives vis-a-vis the USSR will reinforce tendencies to pursue the concept of a common West European defense system. Severe problems on the economic front such as inflation and access to energy will complicate the process of reaching agreement on Community policies. Popular pressures on already weakened governments are unlikely to reinforce those otherwise

disposed toward finding solutions in a broader Atlantic context.

6. Moreover, serious issues will attend the development of detente in Europe. The West Europeans--though suspicious of ultimate Soviet intentions--will endeavor to expand economic relations with the USSR and Eastern Europe and to achieve a general political relaxation in Europe. Thus, in the era of Ostpolitik, the cohesion and effectiveness of NATO are by no means assured. The Soviets, while continuing to seek credits and technology in the West, will not sacrifice their dominance in the East for the sake of detente. The East Europeans, particularly the Romanians, will be torn between their hopes for the kind of greater autonomy East-West rapprochement could bring and their fears that the West might, in the name of detente, concede to Moscow the permanent right to rule its own sphere in Eastern Europe.

7. Elsewhere, Japan, like Western Europe, will move further away from its close association with the US and become a factor of even greater consequence in world affairs. It will continue to play an important worldwide economic role, a gradually growing political role in Asia, and a special economic and political role vis-a-vis both China and the USSR. Smaller states aligned with the US, including Canada, Australia, and several key Latin American countries, are likely to become even more self-reliant and less inclined to follow the US lead.

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C. Turbulence in the Third World

8. The evolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Soviet role in the Middle East will remain major concerns of the US for some time to come. US attention is now focused on the development of a peace settlement, Arab use of oil resources as a political weapon, and the supply of arms and technology to the Arabs, particularly from the USSR and France.

9. The Soviets probably will not jeopardize Middle East peace negotiations since these offer at minimum the reopening of the Suez Canal. In economic terms the Soviets will benefit substantially from this development. In the Indian Ocean a gradual increase at least in the Soviet Naval presence is expected, and the Soviets will be better able to make surge deployments in local crises. Yet the Soviets will be apprehensive about the potential loss of influence in the aftermath of a settlement. They will continue to use military aid to preserve that influence and also, in some cases, to gain access to naval and air support facilities.

10. It is unlikely that the fighting in Southeast Asia will cease before 1980, if then. All countries in the area face ongoing or latent insurgencies. Defeat by insurgents of the forces of the incumbent governments--especially those of South Vietnam, Thailand, and the Philippines--could have serious consequences for US interests.

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Elsewhere, in the Third World, the large non-aligned countries, such as India and Indonesia, and the strategically located states, such as Somalia and Singapore, will continue to attract Soviet interest and, where Moscow finds it feasible, a Soviet presence. Competition in these areas with the US and in some instances China will persist and perhaps grow.

11. South Asia, Latin America, and southern Africa (where black- and white-dominated nations confront each other) are all areas where eruptions are possible and where US interests may be involved. In South Asia, the situation in Pakistan and the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan remains unsettled. And in Latin America, the USSR's military presence in the Caribbean and its influence in Peru and the emergence of increasingly nationalistic and often anti-US regimes pose potentially acute problems for the US. In the Balkans, the passing of Tito might tempt the Soviets to try to return Yugoslavia to the orthodox Communist fold.

D. Emerging Worldwide Problems

12. New kinds of international problems--such as the pace of technological change--and fresh perceptions of some old problems--such as the availability of vital natural resources and the overall impact of environmental pollution--demand, inter alia, the collection of new categories of information. Certain specific developments in recent

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times--including the growth of the multi-national corporation, the potential for extracting resources from underneath the seas, and the increasing willingness of small countries with enormous resource wealth to challenge the economic practices and positions of much larger and stronger states--will obviously affect US world interests in unfamiliar and uncertain, though consequential, ways. Finally, a quite different sort of development seems more and more likely to have repercussions of international import. All over the world, and in all types of societies, there is a growing tendency among ethnic and cultural groups to demand, often violently, that their institutions and aspirations be accorded special recognition; this is<sup>a</sup> tendency which could easily become more disruptive as the decade progresses.

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